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by Ananth Ramanarayanan
For most of the past year, economies in all parts of the world have been 
weakening—from outright recessions in the U.S. and parts of Europe to sharply 
slower growth in China, India and other emerging economies. The pattern pro-
vides the latest example of international business-cycle synchronization—the 
tendency for countries to experience macroeconomic fluctuations of similar 
timing and magnitude. 
While today’s synchronization isn’t unusual, it raises questions about 
the forces that transmit economic fluctuations from one country to another. An 
important factor to consider is international trade. Over long periods of time, 
countries with deeper trade ties are more closely synchronized. This occurs even 
though trade with any particular partner makes up a fairly small part of eco-
nomic activity in most countries. 
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How can small amounts of trade 
transmit large fluctuations across 
countries? An intriguing explanation 
involves intermediate goods—raw 
materials and parts used as inputs 
to production. By linking different 
stages of production across countries, 
they have the potential to magnify 
trade links’ impact on business-cycle 
synchronization.
This explanation has received 
more attention recently because pro-
duction chains are becoming increas-
ingly global due to advances in 
transportation and communications 
technologies as well as liberalization of 
trade policies.
Trade and Synchronization
For the U.S., Canada and 
Germany, fluctuations in real gross 
domestic product (GDP) growth have 
the U.S. and Canada but only 0.44 
between the U.S. and Germany.
Trade patterns influence changes 
in other countries’ correlations with the 
U.S. Over the past few decades, U.S. 
trade flows have slowly shifted toward 
North America and away from the rest 
of the world as a result of changes in 
trade policies, including Mexico’s liber-
alization of the 1980s, the formation of 
been of similar magnitude in recent 
decades. Moreover, the three econo-
mies’ business cycles have generally 
been synchronized—for example, all 
declined in the early 1980s. 
However, it quickly becomes 
clear that U.S. GDP growth has been 
more closely aligned with Canada 
than Germany (Chart 1). From 1970 to 
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Chart 1
U.S. More in Sync with Canada than Germany
A. U.S. and Canada Highly Correlated…
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the European Union in 1992 and the 
North American Free Trade Agreement 
in 1994 (Chart 2). The U.S. remained 
highly correlated with Canada and 
Mexico and gradually became less cor-
related with Europe and Japan.1 
The pattern holds across a broad-
Chart 2
Trade Patterns Shape Synchronization
A. U.S. Flows Shift Toward North American Partners
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SOURCE: International Monetary Fund’s Direction of Trade Statistics. 
B. U.S. Highly Synchronized with North American Partners
Correlation with U.S. real GDP growth, previous 10 years at each date
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NOTE: The aggregate of Canada and Mexico includes only Canada until 1980. 
SOURCES: “Financial Globalization and Real Regionalization,” by Jonathan Heathcote and Fabrizio Perri, Journal of  
Economic Theory, vol. 119, no. 1, 2004, pp. 207–43. Mexico is from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development’s quarterly national accounts database. 
er set of countries.
For a sample of 25 industrialized 
economies, business-cycle correla-
tion tends to rise with bilateral trade 
intensity, measured by both trading 
partners’ imports as a share of their 
combined GDP (Chart 3).2 
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Which of these two effects domi-
nates depends on a number of factors. 
They include the degree of financial 
and trade openness as well as consum-
ers’ willingness to substitute between 
domestic and imported goods.
The Trade Conundrum 
Standard theories may identify 
the transmission channels, but they 
can’t explain one puzzling aspect of 
trade and synchronization. How can 
fluctuations between close trading 
partners be strongly correlated when 
trade volumes are small? 
The average bilateral trade inten-
sity of the 25 countries in Chart 3 was 
0.5 percent of GDP in 2006. The U.S. 
and Canada, two of the world’s most 
integrated economies, had bilateral 
trade of only 3.6 percent of their com-
bined GDP. It’s possible that factors 
besides trade volume determine the 
degree of synchronization, and the 
same factors also raise trade intensity.
Similar industries in different 
countries may face the same shocks, 
which would create synchronized fluc-
These findings seem intuitive: 
Countries that trade a lot with each 
other have interconnected economies, 
and it’s natural to expect fluctuations 
in one country to affect these close 
trading partners. 
In explaining how trade generates 
synchronization in economic fluctua-
tions, standard theories of international 
business cycles focus on consumer 
demand.3 When one country experi-
ences high growth, its consumers have 
more money to spend on both domes-
tic and imported goods. The country’s 
close trading partners then see increas-
ing demand for their exports, which 
creates positive business-cycle correla-
tions by stimulating production and 
growth. 
However, a counteracting effect 
shouldn’t be ignored. If growth pros-
pects are better abroad than at home, 
households and businesses have an 
incentive to invest overseas and reduce 
production at home, expecting to 
receive inflows of foreign investments 
during better times. This leads to nega-
tive business-cycle correlations. 
How can fluctuations 
 between close trading 
partners be strongly 
correlated when trade 
volumes are small? 
It’s possible that factors 
besides trade volume 
determine the degree of 
synchronization, and 
the same factors also
 raise trade intensity. 
Chart 3
Synchronization Rises with Trade Intensity
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NOTE: Trade intensity is measured as the sum of each country’s imports from the other, divided by the sum of both 
countries’ GDP.
SOURCES: International Monetary Fund’s Direction of Trade Statistics; Organization for Economic Cooperation and  
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tuations at the industry level, regard-
less of the level of trade. For example, 
world oil prices affect energy-intensive 
industries in every country. In this sce-
nario, economies that are more alike in 
industrial structure would appear more 
correlated at the aggregate level.4 
Even at the industry level, how-
ever, output synchronization tends to 
rise with trade intensity. For example, 
U.S. and Canadian industries become 
more correlated as the amount of trade 
increases within the industry (Chart 4).5     
So there must be something more 
going on.
That brings us to intermediate 
goods, a large and growing segment 
of international trade. Trade in inputs 
may serve as an amplifying force 
to allow relatively small import and 
export volumes to impact production 
in large parts of an economy.
For many countries, intermediate 
products make up a significant share 
of traded goods, providing intercon-
nections that link production across 
economies (Table 1).
Consider the auto industry. It 
accounts for more than a quarter of 
trade between the U.S. and Canada. 
Within the industry, a large part of 
trade involves goods in intermediate 
stages of production—parts are manu-
factured in one country and shipped to 
another for further processing or final 
assembly.
Recent work suggests trade in 
intermediate goods—not just overall 
trade—is an important determinant of 
international transmission of business-
cycle fluctuations.6 For the U.S. and 
Canada, cross-country industry pairs 
that are closely tied through trade in 
intermediate inputs display more syn-
chronized fluctuations than industry 
pairs with less intensive links (Chart 5).
In the U.S., for example, produc-
tion of automobiles and auto parts 
uses a relatively high amount of 
imported inputs from Canada’s rubber 
and plastics manufacturers, and the 
correlation between real value added 
in U.S. automobiles and Canadian 
plastics is high at 0.7. At the opposite 
Chart 4
Trade Ties Key at Industry Level, Too
Correlation of industry value added in U.S. and Canada, 1971–2003
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SOURCE: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s industry structural analysis database.
Table 1
Intermediate Goods Vital to Trade
Country
Intermediate goods 
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United States 34 1997
NOTE: The figures represent the fraction of imported agriculture, mining and manufacturing used as intermediate inputs  
by the agriculture, mining and manufacturing sectors.
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mechanisms that might be at work at 
the same time.
Determining the role of interme-
diate inputs in trade can be difficult. A 
significant problem comes in the con-
struction of national income accounts. 
The data are calculated with base-
period prices—those prevailing before 
any changes in the supply of imports. 
Foreign inputs are subtracted from 
real GDP, so cheaper imports don’t 
show a significantly positive effect on 
measured economic performance. (See 
box titled “How Base-Period Pricing 
Misses Trade’s Impact.”) 
The reasoning begins with the 
assumption that producers had been 
getting the maximum output from 
their inputs in the base year. If cal-
culated with last year’s prices, GDP 
can’t be higher this year, even with 
lower prices and greater availability of 
imports. Strong foreign growth reflect-
ed in lower import prices doesn’t 
translate into higher domestic growth.
For many years, researchers 
end of the spectrum, the U.S. rubber 
and plastics industry imports no inputs 
from Canada’s food industry, and the 
value-added correlation between U.S. 
plastics and Canadian food is close to 
zero. 
Such industry-level findings sug-
gest that intermediate inputs may 
be key to why countries that trade 
intensely are more correlated at the 
aggregate level. Foreign growth makes 
more imported inputs available and 
lowers their prices, which potentially 
generates higher home-country pro-
duction of goods that heavily use 
those intermediate goods.7 
Improved efficiency at Canadian 
plastics manufacturers might allow 
U.S. auto plants to benefit from lower 
prices for imported parts. If cheaper 
inputs generate significant production 
increases and real value added at U.S. 
plants, it would provide a channel for 
trade to transmit fluctuations across 
borders. Moreover, the channel would 
be distinct from other transmission 
Chart 5
U.S.–Canada Industry Correlation Rises with  
Dependence on Imported Inputs
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NOTE: Input intensity for each sector pair equals imported inputs required from one sector to produce $1 of output in 
another sector.
SOURCE: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s industry structural analysis database and benchmark 
input–output tables.
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where large corporations have plants. 
Country pairs hosting plants of the 
same firm—and thus likely engaged in 
a lot of trade in intermediate goods—
would experience the same effects. 
Future research along these lines could 
reveal whether this feature of the 
world economy accounts for the links 
between trade and macroeconomic 
fluctuations.
Ramanarayanan is a research economist in the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas’ Globalization 
and Monetary Policy Institute.
Notes
1 In this calculation, Europe includes these 
15 countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden and the U.K. 
2 This point was first illustrated in “The 
Endogeneity of the Optimum Currency Area 
Criteria,” by Jeffrey A. Frankel and Andrew K. 
Rose, Economic Journal, vol. 108, no. 449, 
1998, pp. 1009–25. The sample of countries 
included in Chart 3 is Australia, Austria, Belgium/
Luxembourg, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Turkey, the U.K. and the U.S. Belgium and 
Luxembourg are treated as one country because,  
until 1997, their international trade statistics were 
collected together.
3 See, for example, “International Real Business 
Cycles,” by David K. Backus, Patrick J. Kehoe and 
Finn E. Kydland, Journal of Political Economy, 
vol. 100, no. 4, 1992, pp. 745–75.
4 Two relevant papers are “Trade, Finance, 
Specialization, and Synchronization,” by Jean 
Imbs, Review of Economics and Statistics,  
vol. 86, no. 3, 2004, pp. 723–34, and 
“Determinants of Business Cycle Comovement: 
A Robust Analysis,” by Marianne Baxter and 
Michael A. Kouparitsas, Journal of Monetary 
Economics, vol. 52, no. 1, 2005, pp. 113–57. 
Imbs argues that industry structure matters for 
business-cycle synchronization, while Baxter and 
Kouparitsas, using different methods, show that 
it does not. 
5 This finding is confirmed for a larger set 
of countries in “Putting the Parts Together: 
have known that national accounts 
methodology doesn’t allow changes 
in the terms of trade—the price of 
a country’s imports relative to the 
price of its exports—to translate into 
measurable changes in real GDP.8 We 
need a deeper explanation for the 
links between trade and business-cycle 
synchronization—especially trade in 
intermediate inputs.
The explanation could involve a 
combination of factors. One relatively 
unexplored channel is the presence 
of multinational corporations. They 
account for the bulk of international 
trade in developed economies as they 
spread their production chains across 
many locations.9 
Multinationals make up a large 
part of domestic output in many coun-
tries. Firm-level shocks or innovations 
are easily transmitted to countries 
How Base-Period Pricing Misses Trade’s Impact
A diagram helps explain why GDP figures don’t fully account for trade’s impact on syn-
chronization.1 
In the figure below, the orange line represents the amount of output y (measured on 
the vertical axis) that can be produced with a given amount of imported intermediate inputs 
m (measured on the horizontal axis), keeping hours worked and other inputs to produc-
tion fixed. The shape of this curve reflects the idea that more imported intermediate goods 
generates more output, but at a diminishing rate. 
Producers would optimally choose to purchase imported inputs up to the point that an 
additional increment in output just equals the price paid for inputs. If the price of imports 
is given by the slope of the red dotted line, labeled p, production takes place at point A. 
The height of point A is gross output, but to calculate GDP, we compute value added by 
subtracting the value of inputs purchased from the value of output produced to arrive at 
point B. 
Now, consider a reduction in the price of imports. This is shown as the dotted blue line, 
labeled p´. Production now takes place at point A´, but to calculate real GDP, we subtract 
inputs at the price of the previous period, p. This leads to point B´, while the nominal value 
of GDP is measured at point C. Although imports have become cheaper, resulting in a higher 
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by Ariel Burstein, Christopher Kurz and Linda 
Tesar, Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 
55, no. 4, 2008, pp. 775–95, and “Vertical 
Specialization and International Business Cycle 
Synchronization,” by Costas Arkolakis and 
Ananth Ramanarayanan, Federal Reserve Bank 
of Dallas, Globalization and Monetary Policy 
Institute Working Paper no. 21, October 2008.
8 Papers making this point include “Technology 
and the Demand for Imports,” by Ulrich Kohli, 
Southern Economic Journal, vol. 50 , no. 1, 1983, 
pp. 137–50, and, more recently, “Are Shocks to 
the Terms of Trade Shocks to Productivity?” by 
Timothy J. Kehoe and Kim J. Ruhl, Review of 
Economic Dynamics, vol. 11, no. 4, 2008, 
pp. 804–19.
9 For example, data from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis show that, in 2005, 70 percent of U.S. 
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A New View of Globalization
Globalization is increasingly changing how nations inter-
act in the economic sphere. In 2007, the Federal reserve 
Bank of dallas created the Globalization and Monetary 
Policy Institute to explore the deepening economic inte-
gration among countries and better define the forces that 
shape the world economy. The institute is particularly 
interested in furthering our understanding of how these 
changes alter the environment in which monetary policy 
decisions must be made. read more about the mission of 
the institute, the influential people behind it and current 
research at http://dallasfed.org/institute/index.cfm.